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1 - Introduction 
 
The legal issues of atheism in France might be accurately understood by 
considering the weigh of history on the French constitutional system. This 
is a system that has been constantly subject to the tension between the 
present and the past. More specifically, it seems to have been wrapped in 
its religious past yet proud of its commitment to anticlericalism and 
religious scepticism, whose content is being reinterpreted in the light of the 
challenges we face in today’s rapidly evolving world. And, in this sense, it 
has made an important contribution to promotion of the so-called laïcité de 
combat (militant secularism)1, which is not totally immune from some 
incongruities; such as those produced by the relation between 
constitutional objectives and actual policies2.  
During its history, and especially after the Great Revolution, the 
French legal system has indeed fluctuated within two opposing sides. Even 
today, although it supports a strict separation between State and religions, 
France observes several Catholic feasts as national holidays, which is an 
examples of the fact that in France the past appears to be in constant 
                                                          
* Article peer evaluated. An abridged version of this paper was discussed during the 
international Conference on “Non-Believers’ Europe: Model of Secularism, Individual Statues, 
Collective Rights” - which was held at the European Parliament and the Leopold Hotel in 
Brussels (22-23 March 2018) - and it is due to be published in the relative proceedings.  
 
1 M. BARBIER, La laïcité, Editions L'Harmattan, Paris, 1998; J. BAUBEROT, Laïcité 1905-
2005. Entre passion et raison, Seuil, Paris, 2004. 
2 J. ROBERT, Les fondements juridiques de la laïcité, in Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 
2006, pp. 6-12. 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dialogue with the present. This is more evident in the light of the legal issues 
referring to the relationship between atheism and Catholicism, in both the 
individual and the collective (militant) sense of the terms.  
A large number of atheistic organisations are active in campaigning 
on behalf of maintaining or even extending the principle of laïcité. In 2011, 
for example, twenty-six of them signed a Manifeste des Associations et 
Organisations Laïques3 calling for the full application of the 1905 famous law 
of separation between State and Churches 4. They in particular rejected the 
proposal of Nicolas Sarkozy, the President of the Republic, who supported 
the idea of a new laïcité positive (positive secularism)5. These organizations 
varied greatly in scale and scope, but they mirrored the social and political 
footprint of traditional laïcité. The list contained several militant atheistic 
organisations, including masonic lodges, which were among the most 
energetic campaigners. It is important to underscore the fact that some 
commentators see freemasons as the real inventors of the laïcité de combat6, 
whose initial momentum may be deduced from the campaign in the late 
Nineteenth century for a secular public education. And, perhaps, it was not 
the case that during this campaign the Ligue de l'Enseignement - which had 
been founded in 1864 by freemasons and initially led by the educator and 
politician Jean Macé7  - played a crucial part in the reform of schools8. 
 On the other hand, in France the Roman Catholic Church, too, has 
continuously played an significant role in civil society and in politics, as is 
demonstrated by many historical and empirical indicators. This, however, 
cannot hide the fact that over the last decades there has been a decrease in 
                                                          
3 Association des Libres Penseurs de France, Manifeste des Associations et Organisations 
laïques. Laïcite : pas de faux debats. Rien que la loi (http://www.libre-penseur-adlpf.com/article-
manifeste-des-associations-et-organisations-laiques-70770213.html; last accessed 10 September 
2018). 
4 Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l’État, published on the 
Journal official (11 December 1905). See ex plurimis R.H. PENA, La laïcité, Flammarion, Paris, 
2003; J. Baubérot, M. Wieviorka (Eds.), De la séparation des Églises et de l'Etat à l'avenir de la 
laïcité, l’Aube, Paris, 2005; R. RÉMOND, L'invention de la laïcité française: de 1789 à demain, 
Bayard, Paris, 2005; P. CABANEL, Entre religions et laïcité: la voie française, XIXe-XXIe siècles, 
Privat, Paris, 2007. 
5 J. BAUBÉROT, La Laïcité expliquée à Monsieur Sarkozy: ... et à ceux qui écrivent ses 
discours, Albin, Paris, 2014.  
6 J. Cortes (Ed.), Les enjeux de la laïcité. A l’ère de la diversité culturelle planétaire, 
GERFLINT, Paris, 2014, pp. 234-239. 
7 J. GEORGE, Laïcité XXIe siècle, in Cahiers pédagogiques, 27 décembre 2003 (http: //www. 
cahiers-pedagogiques.com/Laicite-XXIe-siecle; last accessed 10 September 2018). 
8 D. LIGOU, Dictionnaire de la franc-maçonnerie, PUF, Paris, 2006. 
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the number of Catholics who are not always active in religious practices. 
During this same period there has instead been an increase in the number 
of those who declare themselves Catholic more as a result of the culture of 
origin than for religious or spiritual reasons. These are groups of people 
who belong to a religion without believing in any divine force. Hence, in 
France it is not difficult to find persons who genuinely belong to the 
Catholic Church because with this religion and the relative values they ‘feel 
at home’. Yet many of them do not believe in the existence of God. 
For all these reasons, if you really want to understand the place and 
the role of atheism in France, you should likewise analyse the rapid 
evolution of the religious scenario in the Country as well as the 
constituencies of the principle of laïcité, which are strictly connected with 
the way of legally managing religious matters.  
This is all the more important when considering some of the existing 
pressing processes, like those related to immigration and globalization. 
These are processes that in the last decades have introduced cultures 
holding religious worldviews other than those referring to the traditional 
beliefs, including Catholicism; which is exactly the case of Islam and 
Muslim organizations.  
Islam is part of France’s minorities with a robust religious and 
political character as well as a strong public expression. This seems to 
contradict the ideological representation of the French republicanism and 
the laïcité model9, intensely influenced by atheistic ideas and the relative 
(historical) manifestations10. In this sense, it should be remembered that 
France is a place where citizenship is at the centre of the theory and practice 
shaping the nation that, in turn, is based on republican secular 
individualism: those who have made a choice to become French citizen 
should assimilate, at least in their public behaviour, the Republic’s secular 
principles11.  
At the same time, these principles aim at reducing the recognition of 
religious communities, their cultural and membership in public life. These 
principles also infer a strong accentuation of the freedom of speech and 
expression, which normally prevails over religions, sometimes justifying 
caricature of their divinities, rules, rites, and symbols. The example is given 
                                                          
9 J. BAUBÉROT, Les sept laïcités françaises: Le modèle français de laïcité n'existe pas, Maison 
des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris, 2015. 
10 P. WEIL, Why the French Laïcité Is Liberal, in Cardozo Law Review, 2009, 30 (6), pp. 2699-
2714. 
11 M. TROPER, Sovereignty and Laïcité, in Constitutional Secularism in An Age of Religious 
Revival, Edited by S. Mancini, M. Roselfeld, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 146.   
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by the famous case of Charlie Hebdo, the satirical magazine that, not by 
chance, functions as both a notorious outlet for mockery of religion and one 
of today’s most popular components - i.e. expression - of the French militant 
atheism. 
In the first part of the article, I will outline the legal issues involving 
the atheism in France, analysing them in the light of what I consider its two 
major streams of influences: the horizontal one, which historically arises 
from the effect of increasing worldwide travel with the discovery that 
people do not necessary share the same values about the nature of human 
being; the other influence is based on the vertical arguments bubbling up 
from the history of the Western thought in a very form of scepticism and 
realism. The second part of the article is devoted to the relationship between 
the French atheism and the principle of laïcité. Here I will take into account 
the role played in this field by the ‘old’ religious traditions, like the Roman 
Catholic Church, and some ‘new’ conspicuous forms of religious affiliation, 
such as those related to Islam(s). In this manner, I will try to demonstrate 
that, since the Great Revolution, and especially after the Third Republic, 
laïcité de combat and atheism has been influencing each other in a constantly 
shifting process of mutual adaptation.  
 
 
2 - The Vertical and Horizontal Influences  
 
In his 1790 Reflections on the Revolution in France, Edmund Burke describes 
La Révolution Française as an attack against religion, which provided the 
most basic tenets to both society and civil government. When searching for 
a word with which to label this diabolical tendency, Burke found the term 
‘atheism’ a natural choice. The term had indeed been used for over a century 
for virtually describing any political, philosophical, or even religious notion 
that dangerously challenged the status quo: 
 
“We know, and it is our pride to know, that man is by his constitution 
a religious animal; that atheism is against, not only our reason, but our 
instincts; and that it cannot prevail long. But if, in the moment of riot 
and in a drunken delirium from the hot spirit drawn out of the alembic 
of hell, which in France is now so furiously boiling, we should uncover 
our nakedness by throwing off that Christian religion which has 
hitherto been our boast and comfort, and one great source of 
civilization amongst us and amongst many other nations, we are 
apprehensive (being well aware that the mind will not endure a void) 
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that some uncouth, pernicious, and degrading superstition might take 
place of it”12. 
 
It does not mean that atheism was the dominant subject of Burke’s 
Reflections. It is in any case clear that it was a common stereotype for Burke 
and many of his French contemporaries.  
For many aspects, they were right: atheism was one of the most 
important key factors of both the Enlightenment and the Great Revolution. 
Yet Burke and his French colleagues experienced major problems in 
defining what atheism really was. One thing was for sure, though: they 
went on to label atheism as a misconception and absurdity. Atheists are 
bigoted and fanatics, they usually said. The rigid dogmatism of these 
unbelievers would be the cause of the fall of the Revolution, they also 
claimed. In other terms, the revolutionaries preferred atheism to religion, 
and this was considered as the biggest threat to civilized society all over 
Europe.  
Now, the discursive strategy of Burke and his contemporaries was 
clear enough. They reversed the accusations against the ancien régime by 
claiming that revolutionaries were devoted to new forms of dangerous 
superstition or, in Burke’s words, “the superstition of the pretended 
philosopher of the hour” who, as atheists, “are not our [Burke’s] preachers”, 
just as “madmen are not our lawgivers”13. This also gave rise to an attempt 
to forcibly include the magmatic world of French atheism and its various 
facets in a single, comprehensive definition.  
On the contrary, for other thinkers, the Enlightenment works of 
atheists (such as those referring to Voltaire, Rousseau, d’Alembert, 
Helvetius, Benedict Spinoza, Jean Meslier, Denis Diderot, and the Baron 
d’Holbach) were positive and essential contributions to modernity. In this 
sense, the Revolution marked a watershed moment in the history of atheism 
in France and in the Western legal system, being the first time that atheists 
actively participated in the public sector. In particular they contributed to 
delineate new roles for the State laws, including those related to 
fundamental rights and freedoms, like freedom of religion and expression.  
In this sense, the Enlightenment and the Revolution were able to 
underscore two major streams of thought of the magmatic French atheism, 
which came from two principal sources. One was, if you like, horizontal 
influence arising from the effect of increasing worldwide travel with the 
                                                          
12 E. BURKE, Reflection of the Revolution in France (1790), John Sharpe, London, 1819-21, 
pp. 126-127. 
13 E. BURKE, Reflection, cit., above n. 12, pp. 58 and 119. 
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discovery that people do not necessary share the same views and beliefs 
about the nature of human being. There were other ways of thinking and 
new worlds where religion, in the Western sense of the term, had no place 
whatsoever (Table 1). But, along with this source, there was a vertical 
influence bubbling up from the past, from the history of Western 
civilization, in a very form of scepticism and realism14. In this case, religion 
was considered the invention of human being and, as Lucretius had said 
centuries before, fear was the mother of all gods15.  
Religion was in other words regarded as a product of human 
irrationality. It was manly based on a philological construction, which was 
at the same time illogical and legally untenable. Believers, the atheists 
usually said, pretend to demonstrate the existence of God by reversing the 
burden of proof: by saying that for me god exists and it is up to you to 
explain and prove that he does not exist 
 
 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, through the Enlightenment and during the Great Revolution, these 
two streams of thought became both the primary antagonist of those 
favouring religious traditional views and the main supporter of a secular 
Republic.  
                                                          
14 J. MILLER, One Thing and Another. Selected Writings 1954-2016, Edited by Ian Greaves, 
Oberon Books, London, 2017, p. 156.  
15 R. FRENCH, Ancient Natural History. Histories of Nature, Routledge, London, 2012, p. 
125. 
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• Scepticism and realism 
• Religion = human irrationality 
• You cannot reverse the burden of proof    
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This becomes even more evident in the light of a fundamental 
historical tension around the question of laïcité (secularism), which in 
France seems to be trapped between two opposing forces. So, it is true that 
in its history France has battled to defend Catholicism: it still remains la fille 
ainée de l'Eglise (the eldest daughter of the Church)16. But it is also true that 
this Country has been natural home of atheism: so much so that, as we will 
soon see, nowadays France is the house of the world’s largest populations 
of atheists.  
In order to better illustrate these relations I would briefly mention 
the historical occurrences concerning two monuments, the construction of 
the Basilica of the Sacred Heart of Paris, commonly known as Sacré-Cœur, 
and the statue of the Chevalier de La Barre.17  
As many know, François Lefebvre de la Barre was a young French 
nobleman. In 1765, he was tortured and beheaded before his body was 
burnt with Voltaire’s philosophical dictionary. It is often said that La Barre 
was executed for not saluting a Catholic procession, which, in the eyes of 
his persecutors, was one of the main ingredients of his diabolic inclination.  
The inspiration for the Sacré Cœur basilica originated on 4 
September 1870, the day of the proclamation of the Third Republic, with a 
speech by Bishop Fournier who attributed the defeat of French troops 
during the Franco-Prussian War to a divine punishment after “a century of 
moral [secularist] decline”. This is clearly shown by the Latin inscription at 
the base of the great mosaic within the Basilica. This building, it is written, 
is a gift from “France fervent, penitent and grateful to the Sacred Heart of 
Christ” (Sacratissimo Cordi Jesu, Gallia Pœnitens et Devota et Grata). The 
word ‘penitent’ has here a political connotation: it refers to the sins of 
French people, their tendency to support fake principles, like those 
expressed by the atheistic mood. For this reason, the Basilica was at that 
time an expression of a desire to return to the God of the Christians.   
Ten years later, during one of the French Third Republic’s moments 
of maximum splendour, the first set of Jules Ferry laws were passed. Here 
the dual system of State-Church schools, largely supported by the Roman 
Catholic authorities, was replaced by a public education system with lay 
schoolteachers18. It should be noted that the French anti-clerical campaign 
                                                          
16 J. BERGIN, The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 2014. 
17 On this figure see the 1766 Voltaire’s novel Relation de la mort du chevalier de la Barre, 
par M. Cassen, avocat au conseil du roi, à M. le marquis de Beccaria. 
18 For example, article 2 of the Loi du 28 mars 1882 sur l’enseignement primaire obligatoire 
affirmed that “[t]he public primary schools will hold one day free, apart from Sunday, 
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gave an important contribution to this reform, which was also favoured by 
some atheist movements. From this point of view, Jules Ferry’s laws can be 
seen as a prologue to the famous law of separation between State and 
Churches, which entered into force in 190519, just when a statue of the 
Chevalier de La Barre was inaugurated (3 September) at the Congress of 
Freethinkers and placed at the gate of the Sacré-Cœur.  
In 1926, the statue was moved away from the approach of the Basilica 
entrance to the nearby Square Nadar. It was then destroyed on October 1941 
by the pro-religious Vichy regime, under which it is important to emphasize 
the attempt by Minister for Instruction to reinstate the Church’s former role 
in French public schools20. On February 2001, in the name of the principle 
of laïcité, the Paris City Council decided to erect a new statue of de La Barre 
at the Square Nadar.  
 
 
3 - Atheism, laïcité and Church 
 
The linkage of these facts and their sequence in time are able to highlight 
the historical tension between traditionalists and modernists. But they also 
make clear the way the French atheism has since the Great Revolution been 
supporting a peculiar conception of secularism. And, as I tried to explain 
before, this is done through vertical and horizontal sources of influence.  
                                                          
allowing parents to give, if they wish, their children a religious education outside from 
public school buildings. Religious education is optional in private schools (Les écoles 
primaires publiques vaqueront un jour par semaine, en outré du dimanche, afin de 
permettre aux parents de faire donner, s’ils le désirent, à leurs enfants, l’instruction 
religieuse, en dehors des édifices scolaires. L'enseignement religieux est facultative dans 
les écoles privées)” (translation mine). At the same time, article 3 of the 1882 law repealed 
the measures of sections 18 and 44 of the 15 March 1850 Falloux Law, which had given 
ministers of Catholic Church a right of inspection, supervision and management in public 
and private elementary schools and in the kindergartens. The 1882 law also annulled 
paragraph 2 of article 31 of the 1850 Falloux Law giving consistories the right to present 
teacher candidates belonging to non-Catholic religion. See P. OGNIER, Une école sans 
Dieu? 1880-1895. L’invention d’une morale laïque sous la IIIe République, Presses 
Universitaires du Mirail, Lyon, 2008; P. STOCK-MORTON, Moral Education for a Secular 
Society: The Development of Moral Laique in Nineteenth Century France, State University 
of New York Press, New York, 1988, pp. 97-109. 
19 J.-P.DELAHAYE, Les francs-maçons et la laïcisation de l’école. Mythe et réalités, in  Histoire 
de l’éducation, 2006, 109, pp. 33-73. 
20 N. ATKIN, Rallies and Resistants: Catholics in Vichy France, 1940-44, in Catholicism, 
Politics and Society in Twentieth-century France, Edited by Kay Chadwick, Liverpool 
University Press, 2000, Liverpool, pp. 97-118. 
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Not only French atheists have inspired a philosophical conception of 
secularism by challenging the existence of God (vertical influence). They 
also have shaped and support a new role for the State’s legal system into 
civil society (horizontal influence). Which is more evident when referring 
to issues of religious faith and the right of freedom of and from religion, as 
enshrined in the Constitution. 
It is important to note that for the French law individuals normally 
acquire freedoms, including religious freedom, through the State and not 
only from the State. In the name of republican universal principles (les 
principes fondateur de la République), the State stresses the protection of the 
public order. As the French Constitutional Council has stated many times, 
those principes are informed by the so-called bloc de constitutionnalité 
(constitutional block), which includes:  
- Article 1 of the 1958 Constitution, which expressly affirms 
the laïcité21; 
- the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen 
(Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) where 
it is stated that “no one may be disturbed for his opinions, 
even religious ones, provided that their manifestation does 
not trouble the public order established by the law”22; 
- the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution; 
- and, last but not least, other principles stated in some 
historical legislative rules, such as those referring to the 1905 
law separating Churches and State, which is one of the most 
important legal pillars of the principle of laïcité23.  
In the light of what I said before, the constitutional block could be seen as a 
sort of legislative codification of the French atheism’s attitude, under which 
the State law aims at treating all citizens alike, refusing to group them into 
ethnic or religious categories.  
This explains, for example, the fact that in France it is illegal for 
public institutions to collect statistics referring to racial, religious or ethnic 
origin: thus, when in 2009 a government commissioner set up a group of 
                                                          
21 “La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l’égalité 
devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes 
les croyances. Son organisation est décentralisée (France is indivisible, secular, democratic and 
social Republic. It ensures the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of 
origin, race or religion. It respects all beliefs. It is organised on a decentralized basis)” 
(translation mine).  
22 Article 10 (translation mine). 
23 P. WEIL, Why the French Laïcité, cit, above n. 10.  
 10 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 32 del 2018 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
researchers to find the best way to collect information in order to measure 
“cultural and religious diversity” in France, critics saw this data as an 
assault on the principes fondateurs de notre République24. But this also explains 
some laws capable of intervening against certain religious “sects”, 
especially those promoting values that conflict with France’s egalitarian 
universalism25. 
Meticulously linked to the concept of citoyenneté (citizenship), in 
France the principle of laïcité designates not only a historical process of 
emancipation of the State’s institutions from religious authorities, but also 
moral-pedagogical goals, actively pursued by the law and fostered by the 
French philosophical-political tradition, in which the atheism has played a 
very important role.  
In this sense, since the 1789 Revolution, and above all after the period 
of the Third Republic, the principle of laïcité has been used as a machinery 
of governance: as a way for promoting the ideal of French national tradition, 
deeply connected with some universal notions, such as citoyenneté and droits 
de l’homme26. These elements have given a solid character to the famous 
René Rémond’s statement: since the 1789 Great Revolution, unable to 
ignore each other, the spheres of “religion and French nation have often 
opposed each other”27.  
From this point of view, the French atheists have turned the 
cathedral of Paris into a temple of secularism, whose structure is 
illuminated by the light of reason. Through this stream of thought, many 
French atheists have then kept reinventing a sort of civil religion, mainly 
based on one reason for all. It is as if they have been able to replace dynastic 
religious absolutism with the absolute supreme value of reason.  
During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, a sort of spiritual 
dimension of the French atheism was thus translated into the belief in 
                                                          
24 See THE ECONOMIST, To count or not to count. A new effort to gather data on ethnic 
origins is stirring up a fuss, March 26, 2009. 
25 See the loi n° 2001-504 du 12 juin 2001 tendant à renforcer la prévention et la répression des 
mouvements sectaires portant atteinte aux droits de l'homme et aux libertés fondamentale. See J.M. 
WOEHRLING, Une définition juridique des sectes, in Les “sectes” et le droit en France, edited 
by F. Messner, PUF, Paris, 1999, pp. 63-90.    
26 E. ZOLLER, La Laïcité aux Etats-Unis ou la Séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat dans la Société 
Pluraliste’, in La Conception Américaine de la Laïcité, Edited by E. Zoller, Dalloz-Sirey, Paris, 
2005, p. 4;   H. PARIS, Communautarisme et laïcité, in Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 2006, 
108, p. 60. 
27 R. REMONDE, Religion et société en Europe. Essai sur la sécularisation des sociétés 
européennes au XIXe et XXe siècles (1789-2000), Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 53 (translation mine). 
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human action, supporting a vision of universe without God: “[r]eligion was 
to be dethroned through intellectual demolition and social privatisation, 
leading to the modern mutually parasitic dualism of the secular and the 
religious”.28 Furthermore, the theory and practice of life in society and the 
State law were elevated to a religion, as demonstrated by Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, one of the greatest apostles of the 1789 Revolution, 29 whose ideas 
of the general will and the sovereignty aimed at forcing people “to be 
free”30. And, perhaps, it is not by chance that these ideas drew their “being 
wholly from the sanctity of the [social] contract”31 and the civil religion, 
whose dogmas “ought to be few, simple, and exactly worded, without 
explanation or commentary”: 
  
“[t]he existence of a mighty, intelligent and beneficent Divinity, 
possessed of foresight and providence, the life to come, the happiness 
of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of the social 
contract and the laws: these are its positive dogmas”32. 
 
Without renouncing the habit of metaphysical and mystic abstractions, it 
seems that Rousseau wanted to propose a ‘religious’ version of the French 
atheism,33 which later was due to take place at the service of the pedagogical 
figure of secular citizen34. This explains why since the French Revolution, 
                                                          
28 V. GEOGHEGAN, Utopia, Religion and Memory, in Journal of Political Ideologies, 2007, 
12, p. 261. 
29 See I. BERLIN: Freedom and Its Betrayal. Six Enemies of Human Liberty, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2003, pp. 27-49; Political Ideas in the Romantic Age, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2006; Two Concept of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1969, pp. 118-172. 
30 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right (first 
published in 1762), Book I, Chapter VII, The Sovereign, Bartleby, New York, 2010 p. 8.  
31 31 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, cit., p. 3. 
32 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, cit., above n. 31, Book IV, Chapter 
VIII, Civil Religion, p. 15.  
33 H. DE VRIES, Introduction: Before, around, and beyond the theologicopolitical, in Political 
Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, edited by H. de Vries and L.E. Sullivan, 
Fordham University Press, New York, 2006, pp. 1-88; V. GEOGHEGAN, Religious 
Narrative, Post-Secularism and Utopia’, in Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy, 2000, no. 3, pp. 205-224.  
34 For some Authors this was also placed at the service of the ideal of leviathan State 
and its collective divinities: nation, demos, race, political party, leader, etc.: see M. 
GAUCHET, Le désenchantement du monde. Une histoire politique de la religion, Gallimard, 
Paris, 1985, p. 35. In this sense, its is very interesting what BERTRAND RUSSELL wrote 
in his History of Western Philosophy, first published in 1945, New York, London, Toronto, 
Sydney, Simon and Schuster, 2008, p. 684: “Jean-Jacques Rousseau […] though a 
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and especially after the Third Republic, public school has been conceived as 
an important place to set about the values endorsing the Republic’s general 
principles, starting from those referring to secularism and citizenships. One 
of the most important and recent examples of that is the debate over 
religious symbols, which, not by chance, has been inflamed under today’s 
irresistible process of immigration.  
The trend started in the late 1980s, when the question of religious 
symbols flowed into the Kherouaa case, issued by the State Council on 2 
November 1992, and, after that, into all circumstances underpinning the 
2004 famous Loi no. 2004-22835. As one can easily argue from its title, this 
law aims at enforcing the French secularism. It pursues this goal by 
forbidding the wearing of conspicuous symbols, which manifests a 
religious belonging in public (i.e. government-operated) primary and 
secondary schools. From a strictly legal point of view, the 2004 law is an 
amendment to the French Code of education, which expands some rights 
and principles enshrined in the bloc de constitutionnalité: namely the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion as well as the principle of the 
equal respect for all cultures and beliefs. These are constitutional provisions 
that have to be understood in the light of the French secularism implying 
the rigid separation of the State from faithful activities. It means that now 
the French laïcité should be not only affirmed but also reinforced. And this 
is because at the moment the Country’s religious landscape is in the process 
of being changed dramatically.  
In the light of a today’s new religious scenario, the French laïcité is in 
other words perceived as defending the secular principle of the Republic, 
which also implies the protection of individual and their human rights 
                                                          
philosophe in the eighteenth-century French sense, was not what would now be called a 
‘philosopher’. Nevertheless he had a powerful influence on philosophy, as on literature 
and taste and manners and politics […]. He is the father of the romantic movement, the 
initiator of systems of thought which infer non-human facts from human emotions, and 
the inventor of the political philosophy of pseudo-democratic dictatorships as opposed to 
traditional absolute monarchies”. See also p. 700: “[t]he Social Contract became the Bible of 
most of the leaders in the French Revolution, but no doubt, as is the fate of Bibles, it was 
not carefully read and was still less understood by many of its disciples. It reintroduced 
the habit of metaphysical abstractions among the theorist of democracy, and by its doctrine 
of the general will it made possible the mystic identification of a leader with his people, 
which has no need of confirmation by so mundane an apparatus as the ballot-box”.  
35 Loi encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant 
une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics. See ex plutimis B. 
BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET, Commentaire de la loi du 15 mars 2004, in Quaderni di diritto e 
politica ecclesiastica, 2004, no. 2, pp. 407-420. 
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against the intrusion of religious groups. Hence, in the relationship between 
individuals, religious groups and the State law, the latter appears as 
safeguarding weaker and more vulnerable persons against any (potential 
and concrete) pressure from religious communities. 
This inflection of the principle of laïcité is clearly reflected in the 
initiative of the 2009 National Mission for Information on veils covering the 
face and body,36 which drafted a bill approved by the French Parliament 
one year later37. In this case, the law aimed at forbidding the so-called burqa 
in all public areas, including urban ones, such as roads, squares, parks. And, 
once again, this was precisely because that practice clashed with the «basic 
values of our Republic, as expressed in our [French] motto: “Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity”»38.  
Yet, all these acts and the relative attitudes demonstrate the difficulty 
of the French secularism model to face today’s religious pluralism-
diversity. It is as if, instead of pursuing a harmonious coexistence, the 
classical legal instruments implementing the principle of laïcité aliments 
serious tensions between secular law and some religious groups, namely 
the Muslim ones39. 
 
 
4 - Atheism, laïcité and Islam 
 
                                                          
36 É. RAOULT, Rapport d’information fait en application de l’article 145 du Règlement au nom 
de la Mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national 
(http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i2262.asp; last accessed 10 September 2018). 
37 LOI n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace 
public. 
38 É. RAOULT, Rapport d’information cit., above n. 37. On this see also the Decision of 
the French Constitutional Council, Décision n° 2010-613 DC du 7 octobre 2010 (https: 
//www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911681&categorieLien=cid; 
last accessed 10 September 2018). 
39 For example, according the Collective Against Islamophobia, all these bans are clear 
manifestations of discrimination against women’s individual rights girls’ rights to wear the 
headscarf in public schools and women’s rights to wear burqa in open spaces and, therefore, 
against a particular religious belief, Islam. See COLLECTIVE AGAINST 
ISLAMOPHOBIA, Le bilan de la loi du 15 mars 2004 et de ses effets pervers (in 
http://www.islamlaicite.org/ IMG /pdf/ CCIF-_Bilan_loi_du_15_mars_et_effets_pervers.Pdf; last 
accessed 10 September 2018); D. BARTON, Is the French Burka Ban Compatible with 
International Human Rights Law Standards?, in Essex Human Rights Review, 2012, 9(1), pp. 1-
27. 
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The changes within the French religious scenario do not involve only Islam 
and Muslims. Nevertheless, given its specificity (when compared to 
religions that have long been present in France) and some problematic 
issues (including the emergence of religiously inspired terrorism), Islam 
highlights the most striking aspects of today’s laïcité. In particular, it stresses 
the issues referring to religious freedoms, including freedom of non-
believers to express their ideas, even when they are intended to challenge 
the validity of some religions and their basic tenets: the existence of God, 
the rationality of some precepts, the veracity of faithful dogmas, the powers 
of religious authorities, the roles of religions in the public spaces. 
Islam has in other words become the discursive substitute for 
cultural pluralism and laïcité, which implies other sensitive matters that, in 
a way or another, are correlated to religions and their position within a 
laïque democracy. Gender roles, clothing codes, family models, debates on 
bioethical questions, the relationship between religion and politics are the 
most conspicuous examples of that. Along with these issues, Islam has 
become the most extreme case of other religious groups, other than 
traditional ones40. 
In this sense, we have to stress that the French model of secularism 
does not imply the same attitude towards all religious organizations: that 
risks becoming a simple caricature or, at least, a truncated version of the 
principle of laïcité. In the matter of education, for example, many Catholic 
institutions are sponsored by the State. In this case, the State normally 
supports, financially speaking, religious schools more than Italian or 
German governments usually do41. How can this be explained? In France 
this is largely due to the fact that, as traditional Churches, some religious 
denominations continue to play important role for both social stability and 
political legitimacy42.  
That, however, cannot hide the fact that religious practice among 
Catholics has significantly dropped off in the last fifty years, with 57% of 
                                                          
40 Cf. M.-C. LUTRAND, B. YAZDEKHASTI, Laïcité et présence musulmane en France: des 
dynamiques d’influence réciproque, in Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 2011, 83, pp. 327-335. 
41 J-LOUIS SCHLEGEL, L’Église catholique de France et la laïcité, in Revue Politique et 
Parlementaire, 2006, 1, p. 67; J. DUSSEAU, L’histoire de la Séparation entre permanence et 
ruptures, in Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 2006, 1, p. 1.   
42 Although it is a secular State, and even considering the history of religious conflict in 
France, few French want religion eliminated from their Country. See F. BRANCACCIO, 
La laïcité, une notion chrétienne, Paris, Editions du Cerf, 2017; J. LAURENCE, Laïcité 
Without Égalité. Can France Be Multicultural?, in Foreign Affairs, 18 November 2015 
(https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/france/2015-11-18/la-cit-without-galit; last accessed 10 
September 2018).  
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them self-identifying as non-practicing believers, only 4.5% attending 
weekly mass. And if you ask these people “are you Catholic?”, they would 
probably reply “yes for cultural origin, but I do not believe in god, so I 
actually am an atheist”.  
At the same time, that cannot hide the fact that the population 
without religion in France is the second largest grouping. And even though 
the composition of the atheist world is not always clearly defined in the 
different surveys - it is difficult to know exactly how many within this 
world are unbelievers (without God), agnostics (unsure if God exists), or 
theists (believing in God but without belonging to a religion) - the number 
of the French atheists is markedly growing. 
Moreover, all of this - including the laws banning Muslims signs 
from public spaces - cannot remove the fact, which even the casual tourist 
notices, of how multi-ethnic and multi-cultural France is at the moment. 
Similarly, this cannot eliminate another important circumstance: only few 
non-white Muslim people have top jobs in France. So, in France many do 
not like it when an immigrant describes himself as black or Muslim, because 
they say that skin colour and religious belonging do not count in the light 
of the Republic’s principles. In reality, many times it appears an absolute 
hypocrisy: several immigrants remain blacks and Muslims in the eyes of the 
French authorities or employers. Which underlines the eminent socio-
economic issues that one has to take into serious account in order to 
understand the practical way the French citizenship and the principle of 
laïcité really perform in today’s civil society43.  
The economic and social conditions affecting the neo-religious 
groups, mainly composed of Muslim immigrants, lead their members to 
consider the universal conceptions of citizenships and secularism as 
instruments for submitting minorities to the majority’s law: this is a law that 
favour some religious groups and their adherents, they normally say. In this 
sense, the uniformity of human rights and citizenship is sometimes seen as 
synonym to inequality or, worst, as legal means to conceal the de facto 
                                                          
43 In 2017 the Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques - INSEE (the French 
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) reports that approximately 7.3 
million people born in France had at least one immigrant parent, representing 11 percent 
of the total French population in 2015. Among this, thirty-five percent are from the Sunni 
Muslim-majority countries, precisely from Algeria (15%), Morocco (11%), Tunisia (5%) and 
Turkey (4%). See C. BRUTEL, Être né en France d’un parent immigré. Une population diverse 
reflétant l’histoire des flux migratoires, in INSEE Première, 8 February 2017 
(https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2575541#tableau-Figure1; last accessed 10 September 
2018). 
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inequalities (inégalités de fait)44. And in the eyes of many Muslims these 
privileged people are often assimilated to the large part of French atheists 
who, moreover, are regarded as the main supporters of the laïcité de combat; 
what, as I said, many Muslims see as one of the legal sources that, in a way 
of another, helps to legitimize socio-economic discriminations against 
them45.    
Hence, the problems caused by the relationship between French 
secularism and some neo religious groups could be interpreted as an 
external manifestation of deeper and broader socio-political claims. These 
are claims that often seep through into the Islamic creed and its relative 
precepts, giving them strong religious nuances. And it is not surprising that 
this is even more evident in the field of education that, as we saw, since the 
Third Republic has been portrayed as a bastion of the laïcité de combat.  
 
 
5 - Today’s Popular Sources of Atheism  
 
These examples highlight the peculiar characteristics of the French laïcité, 
under which the law promotes the atheistic arguments for a secular 
democracy, where the freedom of religion should be substantially relegated 
to the private sphere. Now, the problem is that this perspective becomes 
problematic within the existing religious scenario. Which becomes even 
more challenging in the light of both the new increasingly aggressive 
religious claims and the constitutionalization of religious freedom that, in 
order to avoid unreasonable discriminations, should be used to 
accommodate different practices and beliefs. From here some new issues 
involving today’s forms of the French atheism inevitably stem.  
In particular, those issues are inflamed by the contrast between those 
who continue to support the atheistic idea of the laïcité de combat and those 
who sustain religious-traditional views, which are now sponsored by some 
important religious organizations: not only associations referring to 
Catholicism and other traditional Churches, but also those related to the 
‘new’ strong religious actors, like Islam(s). For these reasons, most of the 
current questions involving atheism imply the relation between three main 
factors:  
                                                          
44 F. MAYANTHI, The Republic Unsettled: Muslim French and the Contradictions of 
Secularis, Duke University Press, Durham- NC, 2014. 
45 M. LAZREG, Questioning the Veil, Open letters to Muslim Women, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2009, p. 88. 
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- the identity of the historical French national secularism; 
- the presence of some ‘different’ (from the past) conspicuous 
forms of religious affiliation;  
- the exercise of some universal human rights, including the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, opinion 
and security. 
Indeed, this relation may help us understanding the reasons for the success 
of some existing forms of the French atheism, like those embodied by Charlie 
Ebdo.  
Since the end of World War II, the pluralistic development of the 
society has led the French legislator to give some offenses a religious 
dimension46. This means that, on the basis of some provisions, someone 
may be legally prevented from behaving in a certain manner or expressing 
opinions against a person or group of people on account of their religious 
affiliation. Nonetheless, even though the case laws concerning the freedom 
of expression have multiplied in recent years, it remains difficult to apply 
those provisions when related to religious matters47. This is essentially due 
to some main factors, namely:  
                                                          
46 From here stem, for example, the new provisions of the Criminal Code, which states 
that “[w]here provided by law, the penalties incurred for a felony or a misdemeanour are 
increased when the offence is committed because of the victim’s actual or supposed 
membership or non-membership of a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion”. In cases 
like these, the aggravating circumstances “are established when the offence is preceded, 
accompanied or followed by written or spoken words, images, objects or actions of 
whatever nature which damage the honour or the reputation of the victim, or a group of 
persons to which the victim belongs, on account of their actual or supposed membership 
or non-membership of a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion” (Code criminelle, 
Article132-76). Likewise, the defamation, the insult, or the incitement “committed in 
private, to discrimination against or hatred or violence towards a person or a group of 
people on account of their origin or their actual or supposed membership or non-
membership of a particular ethnic group, nation, race, or religion shall carry the fine for 
fourth-class summary offences” (Code criminelle, Articles R. 624-3, R. R. 624-4, R. 624-7; 
Decree no. 2005-284 of march 20155). See also Section 14 of the Act no. 90-615 of 13 July 
1990 punishing all racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic acts (amendment to Section 6 of the 
Act no. 82-652 of 29 July 1982): “[t]he Act allow associations working to counter racial and 
religious discrimination to exercise the right of reply in the audio-visual sector”. And, of 
course, see also the law of 29 July1881 on the freedom of press (loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la 
liberté de la presse), in particular Articles 24, 33, 34, and 48, as modified by the law no. 72-
546 of 1 July 1972. 
47 E. DERIEUX, Diffamation, injures et convictions en procès, in Annuaire Droit et Religion, 
2005, p. 107.   
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- the very general nature of those provisions, which do not 
give precise qualifications to offences based on religion;  
- the remarkable, increasingly importance of the freedom of 
expression, which normally prevails over religious claims;  
- the principle of laïcité, which aims at reducing the role of 
religions and religious denominations, especially in public 
spaces 48.  
This explains the attitude of the French Judges when some contested 
expressions are entitled to be treated - i.e. defined - as distinctly 
manifestations of satire. 
In France, the religious satire has emerged through a long tradition 
of atheism, which has resisted all the upheavals and misfortunes, including 
form of censorship that, during the history of the French legal system, has 
exerted direct and indirect pressure. On the contrary, in the current legal 
system protection of satire, including satire against religions and their basic 
tenets, is manly based on some constitutional rules, such as those related to 
the freedom of opinion49, the freedom of press50, and the principle of 
democratic pluralism51. All of this may help to better comprehend the 
famous affaire of Charlie Hebdo’s cartoons; insofar as it demonstrates that in 
today’s French legal context there is a strict relationship of cause and effect 
between the freedom of expression, the right of satire, and the principle of 
laïcité.  
The case is well known and it can be summarized into a question: 
can Charlie Hebdo’s cartoons (published on February 2006) caricaturing 
Islam be considered offensive and demeaning? It should be first noted that, 
in reality, the case began in Denmark on 30 September 2005, when Jørn 
Mikkelsen, one of the editors of Jyllands-Posten, a conservative newspaper, 
discovered that no cartoonist wanted to illustrate his children books titled 
“Life of Muhammad”. For this reason, Mikkelsen made a public appeal to 
“all cartoonists of goodwill”. He received in return 12 cartoons that the 
Jyllands-Posten decided to publish52.  
                                                          
48 L.N. GREEN, Religion et ethnicité. De la comparaison spatiale et temporelle, in Annales, 
2002, no. 57, p. 127; D. DIGNAN, Europe’s Melting Pot: A Century of Large-scale Immigration 
into France, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1981, p. 137; L.N. GREEN, Filling the Void: 
Immigration to France before World War I, in Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies, edited 
by D. Hoerder, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1985, p. 143. 
49 Articles 10 and 11 of the 1789 Declaration. 
50 See on this the loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse. 
51 As affirmed, among others, by Article 34 of the 1958 Constitution, para. 1. 
52 L. LANGER, Religious Offence and Human Rights: The Implications of Defamation of 
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Now, as many know Islam forbids the representation of both God 
and the Great Prophet, in part because of strong warnings in the Qu’ran and 
other religious texts against idolatry or anything that could be seen as a 
pathway towards idolatry. In addition, some of those cartoons traced 
similarities between Islam and religiously inspired terrorism, principally 
with reference to al-Qaeda. As a result, the protests of national and 
supranational Muslim organizations came out vigorously. 
These protests led the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, to distance himself from the cartoons and the editor of Jyllands-
Posten to apologize for having caused offence to Muslims around the world. 
Instead, a year later Charlie Hebdo chose to support freedom of expression, 
republishing the cartoons incriminated. As a consequence, the Union of 
Islamic Organisations of France (UOIF) and the Great Mosque of Paris 
complained that the weekly magazine made public offences against a group 
of persons because of their religious belonging; offenses that, under the 
French law, might have been punished at least by six months of 
imprisonment and a fine53.  
Now, from a legal point of view, this case is focused on the balance 
between two fundamental freedoms, the freedom of worship and the 
freedom of expression. These are two freedoms that in a constitutional 
democracy have to coexist peacefully, without oppression of one over the 
other. This is even more necessary in a multicultural context, where there 
are different religions and traditions. Yet we should not forget that the aim 
at accomplishing this balance is never neutral. It reflects unexpressed 
assumptions that affect the practical, legal outcome54.   
So far as the case of Charlie Hebdo is concerned, if we chose to favour 
the right of satire - because, for example, we consider it important for 
pluralism and the development of the social consciousness - the religious 
experience, as any other experiences, must be subject to the freedom of 
expression. If, on the contrary, we decide to focus our attention on the favour 
religionis, in the sense that we consider religion and religious denominations 
objects of particular protection, the expression of satire would be lawful 
only in so far showing respect towards religions and their basic tenets: this 
                                                          
Religions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 4-5 and pp. 51-56. 
53 For more details see F. ALICINO, Freedom of Expression, Laïcité, and Islam in France: 
The Tension between Two Different (Universal) Perspectives, in Islam and Christian-Muslim 
Relations, 2015, pp. 1-26.  
54 P. MBONGO, Hate Speech, Extreme Speech, and Collective Defamation in French Law, in 
Extreme Speech and Democracy, Edited by I. Hare, J. Weinstein, Oxford Scholarship Online, 
Oxford, 2009, pp. 235-236. 
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would not only result in the reduction of the role of satire; this would also 
make eligible a penal legislation safeguarding religion and religious 
denominations55. In short, depending on the essential characteristics of a 
given legal system, the balance would tilt towards the right of satire or 
towards the favor religionis. 
In the eyes of the complainants, the cartoons published by Charlie 
Hebdo are deliberate acts of aggression, which aim at hurting Muslim 
people, their attachment to Islam and the al-umma al-islāmiyya (community 
of Muslims). One can easily note that the classical communitarian repertoire 
characterizes this indictment. It is in effect based on the demand of a social 
group and their adherents to have the right of derogating general law, in 
the name of their religious diversity. On the other hand, the principle of 
laïcité, which emphasises the neutrality and the indivisibility of the State’s 
law, gives freedom of expression a peculiar protection, which translates into 
a particular safeguard of the right of satire 56. These are the main characters 
of the French secularism that, under the pressing pressure exercised by the 
French atheism movements, is normally opposed to the communitarian 
perspective57.  
So, the inclination of the French secularism model made more 
predictable the decision of the Judges that, not for nothing, referred to the 
dispositions stated by the 1958 Constitution. In particular, the Court 
affirmed that the French constitutional democracy implies the protection of 
freedom of expression and, in particular, the right to express ideas, 
including those “that offend, shock, or disturb”. France is a secular and 
pluralistic society, where respect for all beliefs should be associated with 
the freedom to criticize religions, including Islam, they added. Besides, the 
cartoons were not gratuitously offensive. Instead, they were capable “of 
favouring the debate about the nature and the scope of the Islamic 
terrorism”58. Finally, the Court considered the media context within which 
the cartoons were published. 
In other words, Charlie Hebdo is a satirical magazine, containing 
many caricatures, which no one is forced to buy or read. The circumstances 
of this publication operate as jokes that bypass censorship, using irony as 
                                                          
55 N. COLAIANNI, Diritto di satira e libertà di religione, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo 
confessionale, Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), May 2008, pp. 3-4.  
56 T. JEANTET, L’école et la laïcité, in Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 2006, no. 1, p. 29.  
57 J-LOUIS SCHLEGEL, L’Église catholique de France et la laïcité, Revue Politique et 
Parlementaire, 2006, no. 1, p. 67.   
58 Tribunal correctionnel de Paris, 22 March 2007.  
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an instrument of social and political criticism. Charlie Hebdo is deliberately 
provocative, what allows it to give force and substance to the freedom of 
expression in an openly satirical milieu59 that, on the other hand, does not 
focus the attention only on Islam and religious beliefs60.  
For all these reasons, the Judges acquitted Charlie Hebdo of the 
accusations. Under the French law, the right of satire is an integral part of 
the freedom of expression, they said: this right is highly guaranteed by the 
Constitution and, therefore, must prevail over some religious claims61. The 
Court concluded that, although the character of that caricature may be 
shocking, even insulting, the context and the circumstances of its 
publication in the paper Charlie Hebdo arose independently of any deliberate 
intention to directly and gratuitously offend people of Muslim creed. This 
means that the acceptable limits of freedom of expression had not been 
exceeded. 
This seems to be part of the current trend of the European Union 
laws. Suffice to mention the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of 
freedom of religion or belief, where it is expressly stated: “international human 
rights law protects individuals, not Religion or Belief per se”. It implies that 
“protecting a religion or belief may not be used to justify or condone a 
restriction or violation of human rights”, including those referring to 
freedom of expression. Thus, the European Union recommends “the 
decriminalisation of offences concerning religious beliefs”, because “they 
can have a serious inhibiting effect on freedom of expression”62.  
                                                          
59 E. DERIEUX, L’affaire des « Caricatures de Mahomet » : liberté de caricature et respect des 
croyances, in  La Semaine juridique, Edition Générale, 9 May 2007, 19, pp. 10078-10079. 
60 This is clearly confirmed by the results of the research by J.-F. MIGNOT, C. 
GOFFETTE, Non, « Charlie Hebdo » n’est pas obsédé par l’islam, in Le Monde, 25 February 2015 
(https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/02/24/non-charlie-hebdo-n-est-pas-obsede-par-l-
islam_4582419_3232.html; last accessed 25 September 2018). See also M. LEVANT, Il mito 
dell’islamofobia. Uno sguardo storico sulla caricatura religiosa in Charlie Hebdo, in Blasfemia, 
diritti e libertà. Una riflessione dopo le stragi di Parigi, Edited by A. Melloni, F. Cadeddu, F. 
Meloni, il Mulino, Bologna, 2016, pp. 147-184. 
61 P. MBOMGO, Les caricatures de Mahomet et la liberté d’expression, in Esprit, 5 May 2007. 
See also Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, ordonnance de référé du 10 mars 2005; Cassation 
civ. (1er Chambre), Sté GIP c. Associacion Croyances et Liberté et autres, 14 November 2006. 
62 Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom 
of religion or belief, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 24 June 2013 
(https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/137585.pdf; last accessed 20 September 2018). See also 
the European Parliament, Recommendation to the Council of 13 June 2013 on the draft EU 
Guidelines on the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief (2013/2082(INI)), in 
Official Journal of the European Union, 19.2.2016, C 65/175-179. 
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On the other hand, all of this seems to confirm the fact that the 
atheistic associations continue to protest against the blasphemy laws, even 
though in Europe and in the West the implementation of this kind of law is 
visibly close to zero. In other words, the blasphemy law has become a relic 
of past63, which is even more so in France. The case of Charlie Ebdo is one of 
the most important examples of that.  
It is sure that Charlie Ebdo is not the most important component of the 
French atheism. But, for the above-mentioned reasons, it is now one of the 
most popular. This is due not only because of Cartoon case-law or the 
terrorist assaults that killed 17 people in Paris in January 2015, including an 
attack on the headquarters of the satirical magazine. This is also because the 
content of Charlie Hebdo aims at striking two different targets. It deliberately 
intends to contrast the power of some authorities, including the religious 
ones. At the same time, it ridicules the basic tenets of religions, including 
those referring to Islam. In this manner, Charlie Hebdo is able to update and 
sum up two historical streams of thought of the French atheism, its vertical 
influence and its horizontal action64.  
On one hand, Charlie Hebdo challenges the powers and the privileges 
of the most preeminent religious authorities (horizontal action). On the 
other, it puts into question the existence of all Gods, by simple making a 
mockery of their basic tenets (vertical influence).  
And we should not underestimate the fact that Charlie Hebdo does ‘its 
dirty work’ through a simple funny language. This is a language that 
normally avoids intellectual efforts, as normally requested by some forms 
of contemporary atheism. And this leads us to the current situation of the 
French atheism that, with the help of the existing forms of anticlericalism 
and religious scepticism, for the first time in its long history is becoming a 
very popular social phenomenon; just as it was the Catholicism until few 
decades ago65.  
We would better say that, in the light of this non-religious scenario, 
atheism in France risk becoming very popular. And, indeed, we say this in 
                                                          
63 M. GATTI, La blasfemia nel diritto europeo: un “reperto storico”, in Blasfemia, diritti e 
libertà. Una riflessione dopo le stragi di Parigi, above n. 61, pp. 185-204. 
64 See supra, par. 2. 
65 See Institute Montaigne Rapport Septembre, Un islam française est possible 
(http://www.institutmontaigne.org/ressources/pdfs/publications/rapport-un-islam-francais-est_po 
ssible.pdf; last accessed 10 September 2018). See also Pew-Templeton. Global Religious Future 
Project (http: //www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries/france#/?affiliations_religion_id=0&affi 
liations_year= 2010&region_name=All%20Countries&restrictions_year=2015; last accessed 10 
September 2018). 
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the light of the recent history of Catholicism, which has shown that 
sometimes success is much more difficult to manage than failure.  
 
 
6 - Conclusion  
 
France has a long history of criticism of religion. Many philosophes of the 
Enlightenment have provided the standard anthology of classical writings 
of atheism. One of them is the 1763 Treatise on Tolerance by Voltaire, whose 
sales increased rapidly in the aftermath of the 2015 Charlie Hebdo terrorist 
attack66.  
It should be said that, as already noted in relation to Rousseau’s Du 
contrat social, the leading philosophes mainly wrote from a deist position. 
Or, at least, their writings continued to be based on transcendental 
(sometime mystical) elements and, as such, they were constantly looking 
for an eschatological meaning, an infallible order, and a supreme law. In the 
light of these considerations, Michel Onfray has provided a distinction 
between the genuine atheists, who call into question the existence of divine 
forces, and the deists, pantheists, agnostics who cannot take the final step 
of disbelief.  Even for this reason, Onfray’s work is particularly useful for 
understanding the strong undercurrent of many atheism organisations in 
the republican tradition67.  
We should underscore that this tradition includes the revered 
associations, such as the Ligue des droits de l’homme, which was founded 
during the Dreyfus Affair and has campaigned for human rights up to the 
present day. In addition, atheism remains an influential strand in several 
political organisations, particularly those with left-wing inclinations, 
though it is also present in centrist movements, in the tradition of the old 
Radical Party, and even in some parts of the right-wing movements. At the 
same time, and with a multi-faceted and articulated view, atheism has also 
been promoted by a number of organisations devoted more specifically to 
arguing the case for non-belief and for its political expression in laïcité.  
On the other hand, another important part of the French population 
stresses the strict interpretation of the principle of secularism. One of the 
                                                          
66 J. DUGDALE, Voltaire’s Treatise on Tolerance Becomes Bestseller Following Paris attacks, 
in The Guardian, 16 January 2015 (https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jan/16/voltaire-
treatise-tolerance-besteller-paris-attack; last accessed 10 September 2018). 
67 M. ONFRAY, Traité d’athéologie, Livre de Poche, Paris, 2005; see also the English 
version (translated by J. Leggatt), Atheist Manifesto: The Case Against Christianity, Judaism, 
and Islam, Arcade Publishing, New York, 2007. 
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most recent examples of that is given by the statements Emmanuele Macron 
made at College des Bernardins in Paris on April 9, 2018, during a public 
meeting with the Conference of Bishops of France. The President of the 
Republic recognized the important part that Catholicism has played in the 
cultural evolution of the Country as well as the key role that it still has in 
collective life. This is particularly evident in relation to helping those in 
practical need, he added.  For this reason, Macron outlined the French 
secularism, whose strict interpretation have been damaged in France: the 
laïcité cannot be opposed to religion; maintaining and promoting secular 
democracy does not mean denying faith, he said68. This seems to be in line 
with the words of Régis Debray, according to whom 
  
«the Republic, quite properly, does not recognise any religion. Should 
it, for all of that, fail to take cognizance of them? One might very well, 
as a consequence, in the name of tolerance and a commendable concern 
not to introduce religious divisions and conflicts of civil society […], 
ultimately exacerbate them, by favouring a drift towards private (and 
aggressively sectarian) establishments. The “perverse effect” has more 
than one trick up its sleeve»69.   
 
However, this opinion is far from unanimous. Moreover, it is in any case in 
contrast with the idea the atheistic associations70 have in relation to the 
content of laws regulating some sensitive matters. Suffice to say that in the 
last years some of the most influential and effective atheistic organizations 
have continuously protested against the resurgence of blasphemy laws in 
                                                          
68 See LE MONDE, Pour Emmanuel Macron, «le lien entre l’Eglise et l’Etat s’est abîmé», 10 
April 2018 (https://www.lemonde.fr/religions/video/2018/04/10/pour-emmanuel-macron-le-lien-
entre-l-eglise-et-l-etat-s-est-abime_5283300_1653130.html; last accessed 10 September 2018); 
THE TABLET, Macron outlines positive view of Church-State links, 10 April 2018 
(http://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/8879/macron-accused-of-tampering-with-la-cit-after-church-
state-remarks; last accessed 10 September 2018). It should be noted that the 2017 successful 
presidential campaign of Emmanuel Macron appealed to religious voters, especially those 
referring to the Catholic Church. See S. MAILLARD, Emmanuel Macron et François Fillon 
envoient des messages aux catholiques, in La Croix, 17 April 2017. Concerning the relationship 
between Laïcité and Catholic Church see E. TAWIL, Laïcité de l'État & Liberté de l'Église, 
Artège Editions, Paris, 2013. 
69 R. DEBRAY, Dieu, un itinéraire, Édition Odile Jacob, Paris, 2001; see the English 
edition (translated by J. Mehlman), God. An Itinerary, London-New York, Verso, 2004, p. 
289. 
70 For example: Fédération nationale de la Libre Pensée française, Ligue de l’Enseignement 
Ligue des Droits de l’Homme; Union Rationaliste; Conseil National des Associations Familiales 
Laïques; Mouvement Europe et Laïcité; Union des Athées Association Laïcité-Liberté. 
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different States71. And it is not by chance that this and other similarly pro-
religious laws have also been frequently criticised by Charlie Hebdo, along 
with cartoons depicting sarcastic images of religious figures.  
It should be noted that the rejection of religious belief was felt by 
many commentators to be a key factor in the 2015 terrorist attack. The 
extensive support for Charlie Hebdo’s continued publication was thus 
largely based on the principle of freedom of expression72, even when 
referring to its militant atheism; which not for nothing was once again 
emphasised on the cover of the special issue marking the first anniversary 
of the 2015 tragedy. 
 
 
 
Paradoxically enough, one of the most striking results of the terrorist attack 
has been the rallying of religious organizations to a defence of the French 
principle of laïcité. Furthermore, this has also been a new source of support 
for some forms of secular belief, which address the issues of ethics, values 
and personal life that were previously the stronghold of religions73. It is not 
therefore surprising that some of the existing manifestations of the French 
                                                          
71 See ex plurimis C. CONTE, Contre le prétendu ‘délit de blasphème’, Mediapart, 3 octobre 
2012 (https://blogs.mediapart.fr/edition/laicite/article/031012/contre-le-pretendu-delit-de-blasphe 
me; last accessed 10 September 2018). The Fédération Nationale de la Libre Pensée was oldest 
of these French associations: it was founded by Jules Simon in 1848 and supported by a 
galaxy of leading figures of the French Third Republic, including Louise Michel, Georges 
Clémenceau, Aristide Briand and Victor Hugo. See J. LALOUETTE, La Libre Pensée en 
France, 1848-1940, Albin, Paris, 2001. 
72 C. FOUREST, Éloge du blasphème, Grasset, Paris, 2015. 
73 A. COMTE-SPONVILLE, L'Esprit de l'athéisme: Introduction à une spiritualité sans Dieu, 
Livre de Poche, Paris, 2008. See also A. COMTE-SPONVILLE, Petit traité des grandes vertus, 
PUF, Paris, 2014; L. FERRY, La Révolution de l'amour. Pour une spiritualité laïque, Plon, Paris, 
2010. 
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atheism wish to discover the humanistic dimensions of religions, redrafting 
them in secular terms74. In order to achieve this, they require a new legal 
framework for the principle of laïcité75: a positive-open secularism (laïcité 
ouverte) under which cultural pluralism, freedom of religion, and freedom 
of expression can coexist peacefully, avoiding unreasonable (i.e. 
unconstitutional) discriminations76. 
Thus, the future shape of laïcité (de combat?) is likely to influence the 
coming forms of the French atheism, and viceversa: the future practices of 
atheism in France will certainly influence the forthcoming version of the 
principle of laïcité, its social and legal dimension. It remains that in both 
these cases the existing big socio-economic-political issues (such as 
immigration, globalization, new forms of poverty, social exclusion, the 
future of the European Union) will undoubtedly play crucial and vital roles. 
 
ABSTRACT: With this article, the Author outlines the legal issues 
involving the atheism in France, analysing them in the light of the principle 
of laïcité. France has a long history of criticism of religion. Many philosophes 
of the Enlightenment, for example, have provided the classical writings in 
this field. In this sense, they were able to aliment two major streams of 
thought of the magmatic French atheism: one is based on the horizontal 
influences arising from the effect of increasing worldwide travel with the 
discovery that people do not necessary share the same views and beliefs 
about the nature of human being; the other is centred on vertical arguments 
bubbling up from the past in a very form of scepticism and realism. With 
its multi-faceted and articulated view, the French atheism has also been 
promoted by a number of movements devoted to arguing the case for non-
belief and for its political expression in laïcité. In this manner, the Author 
tries to demonstrate that, since the Great Revolution and during the long 
history of the French constitutional system, laïcité de combat and atheism has 
                                                          
74 On this see C. WATKIN, Difficult Atheism: Post-Theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin Meillassoux, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2011. 
75 R. DEBRAY, L'Enseignement du fait religieux dans l'école laïque, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2015. 
76 This appears to be the perspective of the Observoire de la laïcité, which operates under 
the Prime Minister’s office. See OBSERVOIRE DE LA LAÏCITÉ, Qu’est-ce que la laïcité? 
(https://www.gouvernement.fr/qu-est-ce-que-la-laicite; last accessed 10 September 2018): “[l]a 
laïcité repose sur trois principes et valeurs : la liberté de conscience et celle de manifester ses 
convictions dans les limites du respect de l’ordre public, la séparation des institutions publiques et 
des organisations religieuses, et l’égalité de tous devant la loi quelles que soient leurs croyances ou 
leurs convictions. […] La laïcité n'est pas une opinion parmi d'autres mais la liberté d'en avoir 
une”. On this see also P. MANENT, Beyond Radical Secularism: How France and the Christian 
West Should Respond to the Islamic Challenge, St. Augustine’s Press, South Bend, 2016. 
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been influencing each other in a constantly shifting process of mutual 
adaptation. 
 
Keywords: Atheism, Secularism, France, Religion, Constitution, Rights, 
Freedoms.  
